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Questions of political violence are of particular relevance in 
transitional periods such as the one after the Second World War in 
Europe where, especially in the countries of the former Axis Powers 
and on territories of German occupation, retribution was at the top of 
the political agenda.1 Displacement, internment, political verification, 
and political justice were the main instruments of post-war retribution 
in Hungary 2 , where the new regime intended to legitimately 
differentiate itself from both the national socialist rule of 1944 and the 
autocratic kingless kingdom of the interwar period. The new political 
elite  of 1945 was composed of political forces that formed an anti-
fascist coalition during the war years, which, when coming to power 
with the support of the Allied Powers, most importantly the Red 
Army, strove to establish a new pluralist democratic order against the 
background of the horrific past system. Though the 
institutionalisation of the Cold War, together with the concomitant 
communist takeover, prevented the completion of the great task of 
national recovery through democratisation, it is worth examining the 
short historical period of the so-called coalition era, in which 
questions of democracy and political violence arose sharply in the 
context of post-war reconstruction. 
                                                
1 This research project was supported by the János Bolyai Scholarship of the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the National Research, Development and 
Innovation Office (NKFIH, PD 115 736); Further information can be obtained 
from Zombory.mate@tk.mta.hu. 
2 Tibor Zinner, ‘Háborús bűnösök perei. Internálások, kitelepítések és igazoló 
eljárások 1945-1949’, Történelmi Szemle 28(1) (1985), 118-141. 
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This paper discusses post-war political violence through the 
case of the so-called people’s courts, institutions of political and legal 
retribution, between 1945 and 1947.3 It aims to uncover the social 
conditions of possibility in which the question of legitimate political 
violence was raised in the post-war and pre-Cold-War era. Instead of 
judging the people’s courts’ role according to the present-day regime 
of historicity 4  and normative order (with the memory of the 
Holocaust as its universal reference point), it focuses on how justice, 
transmission of the past and political emancipation were related in the 
post-war discursive setting. This study, inspired by Jury Lotman’s 
prospective approach5 and Reinhart Koselleck’s conceptual history6, is 
not justified by the self-interest of producing historical knowledge. In 
the manner of Foucault’s ‘history of the present’ 7 , it intends to 
provide potential for the critical understanding of the social 
conditions of legitimate political violence in the present-day normative 
order.  
Post-war European justice was established on two separate, yet 
connected levels: international legislation (connected to the 
Nuremberg Trials), and national people’s tribunals. The first dealt 
with crimes which were not linked to specific geographical locations, 
the other treated cases linked to national-local contexts. While the first 
type of crime required new forms of international legislation, the 
second entailed new forms of national justice. The two levels were 
connected in several ways: countries had to extradite individuals to the 
                                                
3 Some people’s courts functioned even until 1950. In total, people’s prosecution 
examined 90,551 individuals, of which 59,429 were put on trial; from these, 26,997 
individuals were convicted (45.42%), 14,727 discharged (24.78%). 477 people were 
executed (1.76%). 46.77% were sentenced to a maximum of one year of 
imprisonment, and 36.69% to 1-5 years of imprisonment. Zinner, 1985. 
4 François Hartog, Regimes of Historicity. Presentism and Experiences of Time, (New York: 
Columbia Univ. Press, 2015). 
5 Yuri Lotman, Universe of the Mind. A Semiotic Theory of Culture (New York: I. B. 
Tauris and Co, 1990). 
6 Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past. On the Semantics of Historical Time (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1985). 
7 David Garland, ‘What is a ‘history of the present’? On Foucault’s genealogies and 
their critical preconditions’ Punishment & Society 16(4),(2014), 365-384. 
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international court if needed, and the international legal proceedings 
certainly influenced the way national courts delivered their verdicts.8 
In Hungary, the system of people’s courts was created in the 
context of the national work of post-war reconstruction. Beyond 
retribution, the main roles attributed to this institution were 1) the 
definition of the political community on the basis of the newly 
constructed categories of political crime; 2) political emancipation, 
that is, making ‘the people’ the subject of historical justice through the 
organisation and composition of the people’s courts’ councils, and the 
regulation of the proceeding; 3) the production of historical truth by 
way of presenting original documents and providing testimonies of 
defendants and witnesses; and finally 4) the imposition of moral 
values of the new regime. In what follows, I discuss these points in 
detail. 
 
Defining the Demos  
The preamble of the PM Decree of the People’s Jurisdiction no. 
81/1945, adopted on 25 January 1945, declares that all those ‘who 
caused or participated in the historical catastrophe which happened to 
the Hungarian people’ should be punished as soon as possible. The 
jurisdiction and the actual practice of people’s courts 9  can be 
                                                
8 See Imre Szabó, A nürnbergi per és a nemzetközi büntetőjog, (Budapest: Officina, 
1946). 
9 Although several studies discuss the famous cases of the principle war criminals 
in Hungary, until today there has been no exhaustive and systematic analysis on the 
functioning of the 24 people’s courts in Hungary between 1945 and 1950. Studies 
on the subject usually provide data categorised according to type of judgement; 
there are no nationally representative data available on judgements categorised 
according to types of cases. The work of Barna and Pető is an exception since they 
acquired data by probability sampling (n=500), which is supposedly representative 
of the 22,000 cases of the People’s Court of Budapest. Differentiating between five 
types of trials, the authors reveal that 81 per cent of the cases were concerned with 
acts committed during the Second World War, and ‘ideological cases’ became 
dominant (with 18 per cent) only in 1948. From this they draw the conclusion that 
people’s jurisdiction cannot be treated merely as the instrument of class struggle in 
the hands of the Communist Party. Anyway, the spring of 1948 marks the end of 
the first phase of the operation of people’s courts in Hungary, when 15 out of the 
original 24 people’s courts ceased to function (see Zinner 1985). There have been 
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interpreted as a specific state-level institutional answer of the 
Hungarian legislative and judicatory practice to acute problems of the 
post-war era, resulting from the ‘historical catastrophe’: eliminating 
the remnants of the unjust past in order to establish the new 
democratic order. The idea of democracy, it is important to note, was 
not restricted to its Western liberal model, and was closely related to 
the need of social transformation. The necessary social transformation 
aimed at the legitimate definition of the political community: from the 
outside, the boundaries of the nation from other nations, most 
importantly in relation to the Germans, and the inclusion of those 
Hungarians excluded by the former regime as anti-Hungarians, the 
Jews; from the inside, it referred to the inclusion of ‘the people’ into 
the political community, and the exclusion of the proponents of the 
former regimes. The left had the inclination to call this transformation 
revolution, but the meaning of the term was also open and contested. 
Not restricted to the Marxist interpretation, on the political right 
revolution also meant radical change.  
One of the few consensuses of Hungarian post-1945 politics 
was that the democratic political community should be, temporarily or 
definitively, restricted in order to make democratic institutionalisation 
possible. The principles of legitimate social exclusion were created by 
way of the categorisation of past political crimes. The Hungarian 
decree on people’s courts defined two new types of political crime in 
order to, as the Minister of Justice put it, ‘provide the possibility of 
retaliation to all those acts that directly or indirectly put Hungary into 
                                                                                                                   
neither systematic nor profound international comparisons of legal retribution on 
the national level (see Deák 2015). According to István Deák, the Hungarian 
system was in accordance with other national cases of post-war historical justice 
(Deák 2001). Ildikó Barna and Andrea Pető, Political Justice in Budapest after WWII 
(Budapest: Central European University Press, 2015); István Deák, ‘War-Crimes 
Trials in Post-World War II Hungary: Retribution or Revenge?’ in Hungary and the 
Holocaust. Confrontation with the Past (Washington D.C.: Center for Advanced 
Holocaust Studies, US Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2001); István Deák, Europe on 
Trial. The Story of Collaboration, Resistance and Retribution during World War II (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 2015). On legal aspects see László Nánási, A magyarországi 
népbíráskodás joganyaga 1945-1950. In: Gyenesi József (szerk.): Pártatlan 
igazságszolgáltatás vagy megtorlás. Népbíróság-történeti tanulmányok (Kecskemét: Bács-
Kiskun Megyei Önkormányzat Levéltára, 2011), 6-55. 
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this terrible catastrophe’.10 These were war crimes, including both 
what the international legislation called crimes against peace and war 
crimes11, and crimes against the people (népellenes bűn), a criminal 
category that was absent in Nuremberg. 12  Hungarian legislators 
categorised past political crimes by substantial law, that is, by defining 
the object of the crime: while war crime referred to making offensive 
war, breaking the conventions of waging war, war propaganda and 
collaboration with the German military and security forces, crimes 
against the people included mainly persecution of social groups (the 
decree speaks of ‘certain layers of the people’, ‘layers of society’, and 
‘racial and denominational hatred’), fostering fascist and 
antidemocratic ideas in public, and collaboration with anti-popular 
state forces and organisations. After its first modification in April 
1945, the text of the ministerial decree on people’s jurisdiction was 
published and distributed together with the expositional interpretation 
of the Minister of Justice. István Ries defined crimes against the 
people as ‘acts that were not connected to the war, did not serve 
                                                
10 István Ries (1945a), ‘A népbíróság védelmében’ Népbírósági Közlöny, 8 November 
1945. 
11 Any act of a person in a post of responsibility fostering Hungary’s participation 
in the war, or preventing the armistice agreement, or promoting war, was qualified 
as a war crime. Participation in the Arrow Cross takeover on 15 October 1944 and 
in state administration afterwards was also considered a war crime since the Arrow 
Cross system extended the country’s war participation and deepened the alliance 
with the Axis Powers, especially with Nazi Germany. Helping armed forces in 
violent acts against people or property, joining the German army or security 
services (e.g. SS, Gestapo), or collaboration with German corps were also heard as 
war crimes before the people’s courts. The category of war crime also consisted of 
acts against the conventions and international agreements of waging war, the 
treatment of POWs, and the atrocities committed against the civilian population. 
All those who ‘took part in people’s illegal execution and torture’ were brought to 
justice as war criminals. 
12 Crimes against the people pertained primarily to the following acts: initiating 
‘laws going seriously against the interests of the [Hungarian] people’, cruel 
treatment by the authorities after 1 September 1939 in ‘executing laws and decrees 
against certain layers of the [Hungarian] people’, public distribution of ‘fascist and 
antidemocratic trends’, arousing and supporting ‘racial and denominational hatred’, 
collaboration with organisations serving the ‘persecution of certain layers of 
[Hungarian] society’, voluntary function or membership in the Volksbund and in 
antidemocratic parties or organisations, and public promotion and support of anti-
popular and antidemocratic measures. 
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Hungary’s involvement, and more intense participation in the war, or 
the prevention of the armistice agreement, but were realised against 
“some groups of the Hungarian people, namely either the Jews or the 
democratic elements”’.13  
In the post-war political imagery there was a causal relation 
between the two types of political crimes. The historical catastrophe 
did not commence with the war in 1939; it was ‘rooted in the 
counterrevolution following the 1919 revolution’, that is, in the so-
called Horthy-regime under which ‘Hungarian soil was mined, and the 
seeds of hatred were scattered’. 14  Consequently, war crimes were 
connected directly to the Second World War, while crimes against the 
people were related to the politics leading Hungary into the war.15 In 
parallel to the causal relation between the two types of political crime, 
in general the possible punishments for crimes against the people 
were less severe than those for war crimes. Even though people’s 
legislation neither applied the category of genocide nor mentioned the 
Jews, it allowed the punishment of deeds committed on racial 
grounds. It also made possible the prosecution of non-racial 
persecution.  
 
Emancipating ‘the People’ 
What the legislators meant by ‘the people’ (nép) is central to our 
interpretation. In a political sense, the concept referred to the 
Hungarians to whom, according to the preamble of the decree, the 
catastrophe happened. So the victim of crimes against the people were 
‘the Hungarian people’, whom the ruling forces, themselves, also 
Hungarians in a way, drove into the national catastrophe. If the 
Hungarian people were the victims, then who were the perpetrators? 
In post-war Hungary, this ‘national paradox’ was solved in different 
ways by various discursive strategies, all differentiating between the 
                                                
13 István Ries (1945b), A népbíráskodásról szóló 81/1945. M. E. számú és az ezt 
kiegészítő 1440/1845 M. E. számú rendelet szövege és magyarázata, magy. ell. Ries István 
(Budapest: Politzer, 1945), 33. 
14 Ries, 1945a. 
15 Szabó, 1947. See also Tibor Lukács, A magyar népbírósági jog és a népbíróságok (1945-
1950) (Budapest: Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, Zrínyi Kiadó, 1979). 
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Hungarians. People’s courts typically drew this intra-national 
boundary by representing only democratic Hungarians, and by 
convicting Hungarians as anti-democratic.  
At the same time there was a sociological conceptualisation of 
‘the people’: it referred to the previously ruled social categories, 
deprived of political rights in the former regime - basically the 
peasantry and the working class, but also Jews and left-wing 
politicians. Beyond retribution, in the eyes of the legislators it was 
equally important to make the people the subject of historical justice 
who, stepping on the stage of history, now had the possibility to 
decide on those responsible for the national catastrophe. 16  The 
ministerial decree explicitly declared that people’s courts ‘return a 
verdict “In the name of the Hungarian people”’,17  
Making the people the sovereign political subject - turning the 
people into demos – this ultimate goal was supposed to be realised by 
the people’s courts’ organisational structure and principles of 
operation. Most importantly, these tribunals were primarily laic 
juridical institutions. Judgement was passed by the clear majority of 
the votes of the five (later six) members of the people’s court 
councils, each a non-expert delegated by one of the coalition parties, 
and by the Trade Union. Each council was chaired by one trained 
professional judge who, until 1948 at least, did not have the right to 
vote. Their role was to keep the legal frames of the procedure, and if 
asked by one of the laic people’s judges, to inform the council about 
legal aspects of the case – without telling how they in the given case 
would judge the accused and why. By putting the ‘laic element’ in the 
centre of the procedure, legislators intended to assure that it was really 
‘the people’ who called to account those responsible to their own 
suffering. As one of the articles in the booklet of the Budapest 
People’s Court put it: ‘According to the principle of active democracy, 
[the people’s court] does not really cooperate with the people but here 
it is the people themselves who are the court by way of delegates 
                                                
16 The saying ‘ruling the people against the people’ well exemplifies this 
conceptualisation of the catastrophe, which of course enabled the responsibility of 
the everyday Hungarians not to be raised. 
17 Hogyan működik a Népbíróság sajtóosztálya? Ítél a nép... népbíróságikiadvány, 1945. 
május 4. Paragraph 51. 
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chosen from their own’.18 It is more precise to say, however, that it 
was not the people themselves but only the political parties of the 
ruling coalition who could delegate people’s judges. Legal expert Imre 
Szabó, who argued for a reformed and permanent system of people’s 
courts, proposed to delegate the judges according to public registers, 
thus abandoning the ‘mechanical party composition of the councils’.19 
The role of the supposedly liberating ‘laic element’ was not 
confined to the procedure of returning verdicts - it also determined 
the work of the prosecution. The decree on people’s jurisdiction gave 
orders about the function of the people’s prosecutors, who had to be 
professional judges, counsels, or at least legal experts, appointed by 
the Minister of Justice. However, on the basis of the ministerial 
decree’s preamble, actual judicial practice created the role of the 
political prosecutor, assumed by non-expert persons. ‘The practice of 
people’s courts regularised specifically the representation of 
indictment because, concerning also the prosecution, it intended to 
enforce the formulation [of the preamble] that the plaintiffs of the 
crimes of war and crimes against the people are the Hungarian 
people’.20 The political prosecutor embodied the Hungarian people as 
the plaintiff of political crimes, and their task, among others, was to 
‘clarify the actual trial’s historical, social and political relevance’.21 In 
legal terms, the political prosecutor was not part of the prosecution, 
since he only disposed of the rights of the plaintiff. While the people’s 
prosecutor proceeded in the name of the Hungarian state, the 
institution of political prosecutor was destined to make the Hungarian 
people part of the process. In some cases, political prosecutors had a 
considerable role in the proceedings: either they cooperated with the 
people’s prosecutor in writing the indictment, or they made the 
process continue even if the individual plaintiff had withdrawn her 
accusation.22 
By making the ‘laic element’ central in the functioning of 
people’s jurisdiction, Hungarian legislators attempted to assure that it 
                                                
18 Ítél a nép..., 1945. május 4. 
19 Szabó 1947. 
20 Lukács, 1979: 272-3. 
21 Ibid. 
22 See Ibid, 274-281. 
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was really ‘the people’ who were the political subject of post-war 
historical justice. The revolutionary aspect lay in this characteristic of 
people’s jurisdiction: the political and social emancipation of the 
people, that is, their transformation into a collective political agent. 
Professional control was included in the system, though. Not only did 
the head of the people’s court’s council have to be professional, but 
also the members of the National Council of People’s Courts 
delegated by the coalition parties. This court of second instance was 
supposed to correct the decisions of the people’s courts and, since 
there was no precedent for the application of the decree and actual 
interpretations considerably varied in the 24 people’s court councils, 
to give guiding principles of juridical practice, to lay down the 
common interpretation of the ministerial decree’s orders.  
 
Documenting Historical Truth 
Besides legal retribution and political emancipation, people’s 
jurisdiction was intended to contribute to the production of historical 
truth. In the immediate aftermath of the war, the truth about the 
‘historical catastrophe’ was highly contested because of the ideological 
views and propaganda of the previous regimes and the lack of 
authentic information. This is why the problem of documentation was 
of particular importance after the war ended. Also, since the 
catastrophe was conceived as a logical outcome in a historical reason-
consequence consecution, it was essential to explore its causes in 
order to ensure that the past catastrophe would never return in the 
future.  
Historical truth was established in various ways during the 
proceedings, most importantly by the work of the people’s 
prosecution, which included the collection of sources and 
interrogation during the interrogative phase, and by testimonies 
during the trial. As one of the people’s prosecutors put it: ‘the 
people’s prosecution [...] every time when it impleads, it discloses in a 
reason-consequence manner to the people’s court how the actual 
defendant’s crime affected the final catastrophe’.23 The procedure of 
                                                
23  Ferenc Fontány Dr., 1 nemzetvezetö, 4 miniszterelnök, 21 miniszter, 6 
államtitkár a népítélőszékeelőtt, Népbírósági Közlöny, 1946. január 5. 
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people’s courts, with such practices as interrogation, confrontation of 
the defendant with documents and victims, the opposition of 
prosecution and defence, and decision-making in the council, 
provided institutional conditions of producing historical truth, what 
Foucault called regime de vérité. As the article in the first issue of 
People’s Courts’ Bulletin put it, informing the readers about the 
system of political justice, ‘Beyond the retribution of criminal acts, in 
people’s courts it is history which is written day by day.’24 
According to the post-war Hungarian social imagery, people’s 
jurisdiction would serve as the laboratory of historical records, 
available to the public. The Minister of Justice even proposed (in vain) 
to integrate the memorials of trials of the principal war criminals into 
the school curriculum since ‘the witnesses of historical times, written 
documents, and even the testimonies of the defendants, all explore 
before the whole public of the country what happened during 25 years 
in Hungary’.25 Contemporary intellectuals, historians and journalists, 
attended the trials in order to attain otherwise inaccessible historical 
records. In November 1945 the Ministry of Justice launched its own 
weekly journal, People’s Court’s Bulletin, which published the 
sentences of the people’s courts and of the National Council of 
People’s Courts, as well as the decisions on appellation of the 
justification committees which, from May 1945, were an additional 
role of the people’s courts; it also published the calendar of trials, and 
in some important cases they made the indictments available to the 
public. 
 
Moral Rebirth 
It is beyond doubt that the constitution of reason-consequence 
narratives of the historical catastrophe had a strong ideological aspect. 
By discursively inscribing what was right and wrong in relation to the 
old regime, people’s courts were supposed to repair the moral order 
and legitimate the would-be democratic system. Their role in giving 
moral examples was never questioned;26 if contemporaries criticised 
                                                
24  Népbírósági Közlöny, 8 Nov 1945. 
25 Ries, 1946. 
26 See e.g. Berend, 1946, 28. 
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the practice of people’s courts, they pointed to their failure to clearly 
trace the boundary between crimes that have to be punished and acts 
that need to be morally condemned rather than criminalised.27  
Another enlightening role attributed to people’s courts was a 
sort of ‘learning by doing’ - that is, establishing democracy through 
direct popular participation in historical justice by way of the ‘laic 
element’.28 In a sense, the National Council of People’s Courts was 
meant to operate as a ‘national super-ego’, because its judgements and 
statements of principle functioned as a practical interpretation of past 
deeds based on the text of the law, and as the just differentiation 
between right and wrong. These decisions were supposed to serve as 
guidance in knowing who merited pardon and against whom 
democratic Hungary must be defended. Through the decisions of the 
courts of first and second instance people could, in principle at least, 
refer the new categories of political crime to their own past and thus 
account for their own deeds before and during the ‘historical 
catastrophe’. 
 
Conclusion 
What makes the post-war era peculiar is the fact that the new regime 
did not exclusively attribute political violence to the representatives of 
the past. Reconstructing the political subject, for which people’s 
courts were one of the most important institutions, also included 
violence to the Self, that is, retaliation against the previous political 
system’s deeds, and the political exclusion of adversaries from political 
life. This is why the problem of legitimate political violence, of the 
principles of difference between revenge and justice, was of central 
importance in the would-be Hungarian democracy after the war.  
As one of the main institutions of post-war retribution, 
people’s courts were meant to inscribe the criteria of legitimate 
political violence exercised by the new regime. Their principle of 
operation was inseparable from the broader sense of history. The 
recent past was conceived as a historical catastrophe that had 
                                                
27 Eg. István Bibó, A magyar demomrácia válsága, Valóság 2-4 (1945), 5-43. 
28 Imre Szabó, ’A népbíráskodás időszerű kérdései’, Fórum .1 (1947), 54-62. 
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happened to the Hungarian people, and the present was experienced 
as transitional where the material, mental and moral remnants of the 
past impeded the establishment of a politically, socially and 
economically democratic society. In this complex social imagery 
where the ideas of democracy and revolution were deeply associated, 
calling to account those who had been responsible for the national 
catastrophe was considered a precondition of post-war recovery. The 
system of people’s jurisdiction served this collective task in several 
additional ways. Beyond mere retribution of political crimes, other 
important functions were attributed to it, of which this paper has 
discussed four. First, by the legal construction of past political crimes, 
people’s jurisdiction contributed to the legitimate definition of the 
political community. The differentiation between democratic and anti-
democratic elements was supposed to solve the national paradox 
according to which both the victim and the perpetrator of the 
catastrophe was Hungarian. Second, people’s jurisdiction was meant 
to serve political emancipation: the legal discourse constructed the 
plaintiff in such a way that the people as a whole were an active and 
collective agent in the trials, and the procedural regulations made 
historical justice democratically accessible by the ‘laic element’. Third, 
people’s tribunals were conceived as sites of documentation where 
authentic historical records would be produced. Forth, they were 
supposed to contribute to the moral rebirth of the nation by 
inscribing what was wrong and right in the recent past. 
The above study in historical sociology focused on the 
changing social conditions of legitimate political violence. Instead of 
writing the history of the people’s courts in Hungary, its aim was to 
provide resources for possible critical positions toward the present 
day normative order. Even if the great effort of building democracy 
was doomed to failure after the war, the way democracy, political 
emancipation and historical justice were relied upon is far from being 
irrelevant today. 
